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Abstract
This paper examines local governance and community power in Korea.
It clarifies the following characteristics of local governance: the local
government has remained functionally and financially limited despite
its constitutional autonomy; the structure of local governance turns out
to be largely fragmented and dispersed; local decisions are subject to
tight central control; local electoral politics is increasingly nationalized;
the local chief executive does not share local governmental power with
other local political actors; economic interests and social identities at
the local level are poorly organized and barely active; and local resi-
dents remain politically passive and hardly empowered. On the basis of
these findings, it concludes that community power remains in the
hands of the local government, especially the local chief executive, sub-
ject to central control and proposes that further local empowerment and
civic involvement is essential for improving the quality of democratic
local governance in South Korea. 
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explores the beliefs, attitudes and behavior of local citizens as a way
to understand the extent of citizen empowerment. The sixth discuss-
es community power structure on the basis of the key findings pre-
sented in the preceding sections. The final concluding section empha-
sizes local empowerment and civic involvement as a key to a plural-
ist local democracy in Korea.
Central-Local Relations
In Korea central political institutions and processes appear to sub-
stantially constrain the local power and autonomy necessary for
meaningful local governance. Korea is a unitary state, where govern-
mental power is delegated by the central government to sub-national
governments. The Korean sub-national governmental system is a
two-tier system. Regional governments consist of the higher tier,
while local governments, the lower.2 Currently, there are 16 regional
governments and 234 local governments. Regional governments
include 7 metropolitan governments and 9 provincial ones, while
local governments include 77 city governments, 89 county govern-
ments and 68 district governments.3 As found in other unitary states,
sub-national governments in Korea do not possess governmental
power comparable to those in federal states. In fact, governmental
power is highly centralized on both the formal as well as the informal
level.
The Korean local government appears to enjoy constitutional
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Introduction 
South Korea (hereafter “Korea”) is widely known as one of the suc-
cessful third-wave democracies in East Asia. The transition from
authoritarian rule in 1987 has ultimately brought about electoral
democracy at all levels of government. In 1995, for the first time in
35 years, the Korean people had an opportunity to directly elect their
mayors and governors.1 This historic event signified the beginning of
local autonomy in Korea. Since then, three more local elections have
been held and on all such occasions, voters were free to choose who
would govern their cities and provinces. Yet despite the apparent
decentralization of the past decade, local empowerment for democra-
tic governance still remains considerably limited. Local governance in
Korea appears to lack meaningful local autonomy, which is regarded
as a minimum condition for democratic local governance.
This paper examines local governance and community power in
Korea and addresses the following questions: Who governs in local
Korea? How independent of external constraints is the local govern-
ment outside the city limits? Who plays a key role in the local deci-
sion-making process? Where is community power located? These and
other related questions will be explored on the basis of the past ten-
year experience of local governance.
This paper has seven sections. The first examines central-local
relations in order to determine the extent of external local autonomy.
The second explores the nationalization of local electoral politics to
gauge the degree of local accountability. The third analyzes the insti-
tutions and practices of local government to evaluate the influence of
key local political actors. The fourth examines the role of economic
and social groups in the local decision-making process. The fifth
1. The Local Autonomy Act was first legislated in 1949, but it was not until 1960 that
the first local elections in Korean history were held. However, since the military
coup in 1961 local autonomy had been suspended. In the wake of democratization
in 1987 the Local Autonomy Act was revised in 1988, which ultimately led to the
gradual restoration of local autonomy.
2. Local governments generally refer to sub-national governments. In this paper,
however, lower-tier sub-national governments are called local governments while
high-tier ones regional governments. Regional governments refer to sub-national
governments of metropolitan cities and provinces while local governments, sub-
national governments of cities and counties of the provinces and districts of the
metropolitan cities.
3. The population size of local governments varies greatly from less than 50,000 to
over 1 million. About two fifths of local governments have less than 100,000 and
about one tenth has more than 500,000.
local government as a whole and are not distinguishable from others.
Their existence indicates the restricted functional base of local gov-
ernment. The second type is agency-assigned functions, which are
delegated to the local chief executive. In implementing these func-
tions, the local chief executive is regarded as a local administrative
agency or proxy of the central government. As far as the execution of
these functions is concerned, the local chief executive is subject to
the tight control of the central government. The existence of agency-
assigned functions also illustrates the limited extent of local autono-
my and accountability.
Another notable feature is the presence of special local adminis-
trative agencies not subject to local electoral control but central
administrative control. These special agencies, which operate inde-
pendently of the local government, embody functional lines of
authority rather than areal ones (Reed 1986). The existence of these
agencies, whose work parallels that of local government, greatly
narrows the scope of local government. Hence, the proliferation of
special local administrative agencies fragments the structure of local
governance and undermines the existence of any meaningful local
autonomy.
The Korean local government is not free to make decisions on
local needs and priorities. According to Article 15 of the Local Auton-
omy Act, local ordinances should be consistent not only with legisla-
tive laws but also executive regulations. The central government pos-
sesses a variety of formal and informal means to control local deci-
sions. In particular, administrative guidance is the most controversial
tool the central government uses to control the local government’s
key decisions. The central government’s intervention in the business-
es of local government is often not explicitly based on laws made by
the National Assembly. Hence, the local government is vulnerable to
politically motivated control of the central government.
The central government exercises a great deal of influence over
the local government’s taxing and spending. The taxes the local gov-
ernment can impose are determined by laws, with the rates of local
taxes varying only within a limited range. Central control of local
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autonomy. The constitution contains a section for local government.
According to Article 117 of the constitution, “local governments shall
deal with administrative matters pertaining to the welfare of local
residents, manage properties, and may enact their own provisions
relating to local autonomy, within the limits of laws and regulations.”
The constitution apparently allows the local government to have a
degree of general autonomy. Hence, the local government can engage
in any activities unless laws and regulations specify otherwise.
The constitutional status of local government in Korea embodies
no formal principle of ultra vires, meaning that the local government
has the ability to engage in any activities not expressly prohibited by
national laws. However, the formal institutions conceal the actual
workings of intergovernmental relations. The constitution permits the
central government to control the local government through execu-
tive and ministerial regulations. More importantly, the central gov-
ernment narrowly interprets a power of general competence for local
government and controls local decisions on spending and taxing. The
local government is subject to the de facto ultra vires rule and lacks
meaningful autonomy and discretion in the management of local
affairs.
The functional base of Korean local government is substantially
limited. A government study shows that in 1994, only one-fourth
(25%) of state functions was classified as local. Another government
study shows that in 2002 a little more than one-fourth (27%) of state
functions were still classified as local (MOGAHA 2006). The function-
al base of local government has changed little since the beginning of
local autonomy in 1995. Notable is that although the constitution
gives the local government a general grant of authority, the law
excludes police functions from its purview. The local government
also has no direct control over the provision of educational services
within its geographic boundaries.
The Korean local government performs both autonomous and
assigned functions. For the latter the central government provides fis-
cal support. The assigned functions can be divided into two types.
The first type is entity-assigned functions, which are delegated to the
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taxes is exceedingly tight, while local discretion to shape spending
priorities is slight.4 The local government is also limited in its ability
to increase local revenues through borrowing. The central govern-
ment can enforce the local government’s fiscal responsibility through
a multitude of rules and regulations.
As shown in Table 1, a majority of Korean local governments
register low levels of financial autonomy (Kwon 2004). As of 2004,
more than half of them depended on the central government for more
than 70 percent of their budgets. Over the last decade, levels of finan-
cial local autonomy have declined rather than risen. For instance,
levels of financial autonomy for city governments sharply fell from 53
percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 2004. For county governments they
decreased from 23 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in 2004. For district
governments they also dropped from 53 percent in 1996 to 43 percent
in 2004. As these figures evidently show, most local governments in
Korea tend to spend far more than what they collect in tax revenues.
Consequently, they have to rely heavily on the central government
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for supplementing their ordinary expenditures as well as financing
their local projects. The Korean local government has yet to achieve
financial autonomy.
As local autonomy was restored in 1995, the system of local
administration was transformed into the system of local government.
However, the power of local government has increased little and
remains substantially circumscribed for the last decade. Despite its
constitutional autonomy, the Korean local government has yet to
achieve enough autonomy for meaningful democratic governance.
The intergovernmental distribution of authority and resources indi-
cates the limited general competence for local government. The func-
tional and financial bases of local government evidently show dispro-
portionately unequal power distribution between the center and local-
ities, which hinders the enhancement of the democratic foundations
of local government. In the highly centralized system of intergovern-
mental relations, it is no wonder that local governance is largely deter-
mined by central governmental institutions and processes.
Local Elections
Popular authorization of local government is a minimum condition
for democratic local governance. As mentioned earlier, such a condi-
tion came into being in Korea in 1995, when mayors and governors
as well as councilors were directly elected by local residents. Before
1995, the chief executive of the local government was appointed by
the central government. Since 1995, the local government has been
subject to popular elections rather than central appointment. Mayors,
governors, and councilors are currently chosen in partisan elections.
Until the last local election in May 2006, local councilors had been
chosen in non-partisan elections. Despite increasing popular opposi-
tion to the politicization of local governance, the influence of national
political parties in local elections appears to have increased rather
than decreased.
For the past decade, local electoral turnout has gradually de-
4. The central government’s use of allocation tax in favor of local governments with
low levels of financial autonomy discourages local governments to expand the tax
base.
Table 1. Financial Autonomy of Local Governments
Levels of Financial Autonomy (%) Number of Local Governments (%)
90 and higher 1.3
70-90 1.3
50-70 7.3
30-50 35.0
10-30 50.9
Lower than 10 4.3
Total (234)
Source: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (http://login.moga-
ha.go.kr)
clined. More than two thirds (68%) of the electorate cast their ballots
in the 1995 local election. However, in the subsequent local elections
only barely a half (53% in 1998, 49% in 2002 and 51% in 2006)
went to the poll. Popular enthusiasm for a grassroots democracy,
which was strong in the aftermath of political democratization in
1987, has been apparently subdued. One notable feature of Korean
local politics has been the increasing nationalization of local elec-
tions. Local issues and personalities rarely dominate local elections,
which are often regarded as referenda on the central government.
Local elections appear to be a sideshow of, or an appendage to,
national politics. The nationalization of local elections greatly
restricts the degree of local accountability essential for democratic
local governance.
As a result, regional cleavages in local elections become as deep
as those in national ones. In all local elections held since 1995, a
majority of the electorate voted for parties that were identified with
their regions of residence, namely their hometown parties. As shown
in Table 2, for instance, in the Yeongnam region, which has been a
stronghold of the Grand National Party (GNP), the percentage of
elected GNP mayoral candidates was 50 percent in 1995, 68 percent
in 1998, 87 percent in 2002, and 86 percent in 2006. In the Honam
region, which has been a stronghold of the Democratic Party (DP) or
the Uri Party (UP),5 the percentage of elected DP or UP mayoral can-
didates was 93 percent in 1995 and 71 percent in all of the subse-
quent elections of 1998, 2002, and 2006. In contrast, the electoral
performances of these parties in rival regions appear to have been
miserable. In the Honam region, no GNP mayoral candidates have
been elected in the last four local elections. In the Yeongnam region,
only one DP mayoral candidate was elected in 1995 and 1998, none
in 2002 and two UP mayoral candidates in 2006. 
These voting patterns amply illustrate a great deal of influence major
national parties have over local elections. To a large extent, local
electoral accountability appears to be substantially limited. Since
party labels are generally important for mobilizing votes, indepen-
dent candidates cannot compete effectively with party candidates. It
is a great advantage to run for local offices under the hegemonic
party flag. In localities where hegemonic parties exist, party nomina-
tion is regarded as a sufficient condition for winning elections. In
those localities, the local government tends to be monopolized by a
single party. 
Still, this does not mean that local issues and personalities are
never relevant in local elections. Rather it underlines the fact that
being a candidate of a regional hegemonic party greatly affects the
chance of his winning the election (Hwang 2002). As local elections
are used to pass judgment on the central government, electoral out-
comes rarely reflect the performance of a party in local power. The
nationalization and regionalism of electoral choice greatly reduces
local accountability, which further undermines the basis of democrat-
ic local governance.
Until the last local election in May 2006, the local council elec-
tion had been a single-member ward system (first past the post)
without any form of proportional representation. Currently, it is a
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5. The UP, which was separated from the DP in 2004, is the ruling party.
Table 2. Party Affiliations of Elected Heads of Local Governments
Year 
Grand National Party Democratic Party (Uri Party)
1995 1998 2002 2006 1995 1998 2002 2006
Yeongnam* 34(68) 49(72) 61(70) 60(70) 1(68) 1(72) 0(70) 2(70)
Honam** 0(43) 0(41) 0(41) 0(41) 40(43) 29(41) 29(41) 29(41)
Entries are the number elected, with the total number of contested mayoral positions
in parenthesis.
* Includes Busan, Daegu, Ulsan, Gyeongsangnam-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do.
** Includes Gwangju, Jeollanam-do, and Jeollabuk-do. 
Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
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functions. However, the power of local government is organized in
favor of the mayor over the local council. For instance, the mayor
has the authority to appoint local bureaucrats, to submit a budget of
expenditures and revenues, and to veto ordinances passed by the
local council.
Reflecting the internal structure of local government, the mayor
dominates local political processes (Park C. 2000b). The mayor plays
a leading role in both policy-making and administration. He domi-
nates budgeting processes and makes key administrative appoint-
ments. His formal authority and monopoly of information, assisted
by the professional local bureaucracy, makes him prevail over other
local political actors. He holds a much wider base of geographic polit-
ical representation than any other locally based politicians. The
mayor is able to engage in distributive politics based on a particular-
istic exchange of benefits. By financing their pet projects, the mayor
can induce councilors to side with him in the local policy process.
The local council is officially responsible for making all ordi-
nances and performing representative and oversight functions. Yet,
because of the local council’s low expertise and resources, polic
initiatives are likely to come from the local bureaucracy headed by
the mayor. Rather than seeing the local council as a representative
political institution, individual councilors develop particularistic
exchange relationships with the mayor who can dispense local public
resources. The mayor can offer councilors spending favors in return
for their general support. The mayor’s informal coalition of local
clients may perform a role similar to that of local political machines
(Guterbock 1980).
The mayor commands the professional local bureaucracy by
exercising his formal authority. However, the mayor’s control over
local bureaucrats is by no means complete. Local bureaucrats tend to
develop functional loyalties based on professional expertise defined
by the central bureaucracy. They used to be regarded as public ser-
vants belonging to the MOGAHA (Ministry of Government Adminis-
tration and Home Affairs). Therefore, local bureaucrats tend to be
susceptible to central regulations and standards. They would be
multi-member ward system with some form of proportional represen-
tation. Whether this electoral system change would lower the
chances of a single party being able to have majority control of the
local government and thereby a weakening of regionalism in local
politics remains to be seen.
Local Government
The form of local government in Korea reflects democratic institution-
al principles such as separation of powers and checks and balances.
Executive power belongs to the mayor while legislative power, to the
local council.6 According to Article 118 of the Constitution, “the local
government shall have a council” and “the organization and powers
of local councils, and the election of their members; election proce-
dures for chief executives of local governments; and other matters
pertaining to the organization and operation of local governments
shall be determined by laws.” Every local government in Korea main-
tains the same form of government and there is no exception.
The mayor and the councilors are popularly elected through par-
tisan ballots. Thus, the structure of local government primarily
embodies the principle of political accountability. In contrast, the rest
of local officials are not elected but appointed based on merit. The
local bureaucracy, which has long developed professional norms of
administration, is the core of local government. Hence, we can say
that the structure of local government embodies the principle of
administrative efficiency as well.
The Korean local government maintains a strong mayor/weak
council form of government. The mayor and the local council official-
ly share budgeting, legislation of ordinances, and other policy-making
6. In this paper the mayor refers to the chief executive of local government while the
governor, that of regional government. Similarly, the local council refers to the
council of local government while the regional council, that of regional govern-
ment.
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reluctant to support the mayor’s local decisions, if they are not com-
patible with central guidelines. Professional norms of efficiency and
neutrality help local bureaucrats resist strong pressures from the
mayor. It does not mean, however, that local bureaucrats do not fall
under the influence of the mayor. Individual local bureaucrats devel-
op particularistic exchange relationships with the mayor, who makes
personnel decisions.
In short, the institutions and processes of local government have
made it possible for the mayor to dominate local politics over the last
decade (Park C. 2000b). The mayor does not share local governmen-
tal power significantly with other local political actors. He appears to
control local political processes through various clientelist strategies
(Piattoni 2001). The practices of local government appear to fall short
of the ideal of democratic governance.
Local Economic and Social Groups
Democratic governance requires a vibrant local society, which
encompasses a diversity of market and civil society actors (Putnam
1993). Yet, Korean local society is hardly vibrant. First, economic
interests in local Korea are poorly organized. Local chambers of com-
merce fail to play a key role in representing local business interests.
Since there are industry-by-industry national associations, individual
local businesses rarely find local chambers of commerce effective in
representing their interests. As a result, local chambers of commerce
fail to render themselves a major force in the local political process.
Local business interests in Korea enjoy hardly any “systemic power”
(Stone 1980).
In a sense, the poor organization of economic interests attests the
limited scope or authority of local government. As noted earlier,
Korean local governments, unlike those in federal states, have not
much discretion to pursue development policies by using tax abate-
ment, land grants, subsidies, and so forth (Peterson 1981). The range
of policy instruments and options the local government can choose is
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substantially restricted. Therefore, economic interests have few
incentives to organize themselves locally.
Second, there are some local branches of government-sponsored
associations, professional organizations and civic groups. Perhaps
because of the limited scope of local government, however, local pol-
itics hardly is the locus of civic engagement or the arena of group
activities. A few individual members make use of their associational
memberships to advance personal ambitions for local offices or to get
local benefits for themselves. These groups rarely serve to represent
and promote the common interests of their members.7
In contrast, the influence of civic groups on the local political
process appears to be increasingly visible. New social movements
such as environment protection, consumer rights and feminist move-
ments have spawned various local civic or issue groups. These vol-
untary groups become increasingly significant forces in local gover-
nance. Whether these changes would empower local society and
bring about significant changes in the distribution of local power
remains to be seen.
Third, neighborhoods remain atomized rather than organized. As
discussed in the following section, popular involvement in local poli-
tics is largely passive and particularized. Yet, local residents some-
times organize themselves when their own real property interests are
at stake. In this regard, local political conflict, if any, has more to do
with residence than to occupation. To some extent, local politics in
Korea reflects the politics of landed interests (Logan and Molotch
1987). Local people tend to be mobilized, if not organized, as resi-
dents of particular neighborhoods, not as members of economic
classes. Class conflict is hardly a feature of Korean local politics.
Overall, Korean local society is largely unorganized. There are
only a few, if any, organized groups. Furthermore, they tend to serve
a few members’ particularistic self-interests rather than the categori-
7. A notable feature of Korean local politics is that alumni associations of local elite
high schools serve as the most important source of political, economic and social
community leaders (Park C. 2000b).
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of local governance can also be found in the broad opposition to the
party nomination of council candidates. In the 1999 five cities sample
survey, an average of 57 percent exhibited opposition to the party
nomination of council candidates (Park C. 2003). In a national sam-
ple survey in 2000, more than a half (55%) of respondents expressed
opposition to the party nomination of council candidates (MOGAHA
2002). All of these findings evidently illustrate not only popular cyni-
cism toward party politics at the local level but also discontent with
the current local election system.
Democratic governance requires citizen involvement and
activism. Yet the 1999 five cities sample survey indicates that local
people’s level of knowledge about local politics was considerably low
(Park C. 2003). A majority of local residents did not know who their
mayors or councilors were. They did not know whether the party
nomination of candidates for local offices was allowed or not. These
findings illustrate a lack of popular interest in local politics. Since
local people have little motivation and few incentives to acquire local
political information, their understanding of local politics appears to
be unclear or ambiguous.
The 1999 five cities sample survey shows that an average of 65
percent said they had little or no interest in local politics and that an
average of 76 percent said they seldom or never talked about local
affairs with neighbors (Park C. 2003). In the 2000 national sample
survey, only 30 percent of respondents exhibited some degree of
interest in local government (MOGAHA 2002). These findings show
that a majority of local people prefer to be bystanders, not active par-
ticipants in local political processes. For them, local politics was not a
major concern.
Citizen empowerment is essential for democratic governance.
However, a nine cities sample survey in 2003 shows that an average
of only 30 percent felt politically competent (Park and Kang 2005).9
cal collective interests of the group. A large segment of local society
remains marginalized in the local political process. There is yet to be
a socio-economic order contributing to either elitist or pluralist rule. 
Local Citizens
Democratic local governance requires an active local citizenry with
allegiant and participant political orientations. Despite declining elec-
toral turnout, electoral local democracy is widely supported. In a five
cities sample survey in 1999, an average of 86 percent was support-
ive of the popular election of the mayor (Park C. 2003).8 A 2001
national sample survey of the electorate shows that 85 percent of
respondents were supportive of a system in which the mayor would
be elected directly by local residents (MOGAHA 2002). These find-
ings suggest that a belief in the legitimacy of electoral local democra-
cy is widely held among Korean people.
However, local residents hardly feel the presence of local govern-
ment. In the 1999 five cities sample survey, only an average of 8 per-
cent saw the local government as having much impact on their daily
lives. Moreover, an average of 62 percent believed that local govern-
ment made little or no difference in improving local conditions (Park
C. 2003).
Despite broad support for electoral local democracy, there is also
widespread opposition to the party politicization of local governance.
In a 1999 five cities sample survey, an average of 56 percent showed
opposition to the party nomination of mayoral candidates (Park C.
2003). In a 2001 national sample survey of the electorate, 60 percent
of respondents were opposed to an election system in which mayoral
candidates run under the banner of political parties (MOGAHA 2002).
In the most recent national sample survey in 2005, more than half
(52%) of the respondents were still opposed to the party nomination
of mayoral candidates (MOGAHA 2005). An anti-party politics vision
8. The five cities include Bucheon, Cheongju, Jinju, Pyeongtaek and Seongnam.
9. The nine cities include five metropolitan cities such as Busan, Daegu, Daejeon,
Gwangju, and Incheon and four mid-sized cities such as Cheongju, Chuncheon,
Jeonju, and Suwon.
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and passivity. A self-confident, empowered local citizenry for democ-
ratic governance still remains to be developed.
Community Power
After having examined intergovernmental relations, local political
institutions and processes, market and civil society actors, and mass
political life, we may argue that the Korean local government is con-
siderably low on Type II autonomy, which means that the local gov-
ernment is less able to pursue local interests “independently of cen-
tral government restrictions and preferences or professional groups
capable of nationalizing policy options irrespective of a locality’s dis-
tinctive character” (King and Pierre 1990, 2). To the extent that local
autonomy is highly constrained by the central government, the bulk
of community power rests in the hands of the central government.
Given the key role that is attributed to the central government, we
may wonder where the remaining community power is located. Who
governs within the city limits?
Basically, there are two competing theories of community power
structure, namely elitism and pluralism (Waste 1986). Elitists argue
that community power is monopolized by a power elite committed to
the social and economic status quo. They contend that the socioeco-
nomic elite who possess wealth and social status control all the key
governmental decisions and the local political agenda (Hunter 1953;
Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Elitists describe the elected officials as
their proxies, who merely execute the decisions made by the ruling
class or the power elite.
In contrast, pluralists claim that community power is widely dis-
persed. They reject the view that inequalities of power are cumula-
tive (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1980). Instead political influence is dispersed
to the extent that individuals and groups who are influential in one
issue area may not be influential in others. Pluralists consider public
policy as an outcome of fair competition among a diversity of groups
in an open political process.
Local people seemed to feel cognitively impotent when confronted by
a complexity of local politics close to their ordinary lives. The 1999
five cities sample survey shows that there is a sense of powerlessness
among local people when dealing with control within democratic
government (Park C. 2003). All of these findings suggest that an
empowered local citizenry has yet to develop.
It is widely argued that the social capital of associational mem-
bership and social trust contributes to the performance of democratic
political institutions (Putnam 1993). Yet, the 1999 five cities sample
survey shows the extent of membership in voluntary associations to
have been extremely limited. Nearly four in five people were not
affiliated with any social organizations (Park C. 2003). A 2003 nation-
al sample survey reports that a majority of ordinary Koreans rarely
joined them (Park and Shin 2005). These findings show that a vast
majority of local people are not effectively linked to social networks
that tend to infuse them with civic virtues. They remain socially dis-
connected. It is evident that associational life in local Korea falls far
short of the ideal of civic democracy.
Social trust is the cultural aspect of social capital. It is widely
believed that trust, especially generalized sense of trust, contributes
to facilitating civic cooperation for the common good, which
enhances the quality of democratic governance (Putnam 1993). Yet,
the 1999 five cities sample survey shows that only an average of 38
percent agreed that “most people can be trusted” (Park C. 2003). The
2003 national sample survey shows that less than two-fifths (39%)
expressed trust in other people (Park and Shin 2005). These findings
evidently attest to the low levels of social capital.
Democratic governance requires a competent citizenry that is
well informed about local political issues, socially interactive, as well
as participatory (Almond and Verba 1963). The lack of an active citi-
zenry may make the enhancement of the quality of local democracy
difficult. As presented above, Korean local citizenship reflects a great
deal of democratic deficit. In fact, mass political life at the local level
may be characterized, not by the participant culture of involvement
and activism, but by the parochial or subject culture of alienation
or identity-sharing with councilors, bureaucrats, businessmen and
social notables as well as national politicians.10 The performance of
mayor-dominant governance depends upon the stability of these net-
works, in which the mayor serves as the key nexus. Without stable
local and trans-local networks, the mayor would face political immo-
bilism or even ungovernability within the community (Choi 1999).
As democratization gradually empowers civil society and global
competition increasingly strengthens market actors, it would be hard
for the mayor to continue to control the local decision-making
process in the near future. However, for the past decade the poor
organization and relative powerlessness of the market and civil soci-
ety at the local level has permitted the mayor-led local government to
characterize local governance. Local democratization has trans-
formed the nature of interest representation from the administrative
to political spheres. Yet, since interests are poorly organized and ide-
ological political parties are underdeveloped, self-representation
rather than group representation dominates the local political process
(Lande 1973). In this regard, Korean community power structure may
be characterized as state clientelism rather than elitism or pluralism.
To the extent that intergovernmental power structure is highly
centralized and local electoral politics nationalized, it is no wonder
that community power remains in the hands of trans-local political
forces not bound by the city limits. Within the realm of a given local
autonomy, residual community power appears to be monopolized by
the local government, especially the mayor. As noted earlier, the
mayor develops local networks of clientelism by manipulating the
allocation of public resources (Piattoni 2001; Fox 1994). As national
politics influences local governance, these networks may extend to
include powerful national politicians as the mayor’s patron(s). The
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As discussed in the preceding sections, community power in
Korea appears to be concentrated in the hands of the local govern-
ment, especially the mayor, rather than dispersed among a large
number of competing interests or monopolized by the socioeconomic
elite. Local governance is hardly dominated by business interests,
which are poorly organized and thus relatively powerless. There is
no evidence that economic interests control all key local decisions. At
most, individual businessmen may make an effort to establish con-
nections with those running the city hall in order to protect or benefit
their own businesses. Social interests or identities at the local level
are also poorly organized and thus relatively powerless. Hence, it is
hardly surprising that the mayor who controls the local government
plays a predominant role in the local decision-making process. A
study of the political power structure in Busan through an analysis of
controversial policy issues found that the mayor was most powerful
in the policy process given the influence of central government (Kim
1998). Research on the local political process in Incheon revealed
that the local government, especially as embodied in the mayor,
remained powerful despite an increasing influence of local civil asso-
ciations (Jeong 1998). By using the decisional method, a study of
community power in the five cities mentioned above showed that the
mayor controlled the local policy process on important local issues
(Yoo 2000; Bae 2000; Park C. 2000a). By using the reputational
method, a recent 2003 elite survey on community power in the nine
cities mentioned above also confirmed that, regardless of policy deci-
sions, the mayor was ranked as the most influential among those pre-
sumed to exercise influence in local government, business, civic or
social circles (Park D. 2004).
In this regard, community power in Korea is largely monopolized
by the local government. Since the local government is controlled by
the mayor, Korean local governance can be described as mayor-domi-
nant governance (Park C. 2000b). The mayor exercises a great deal of
influence over local public resources and controls the outcome of key
decisions within the community. The mayor maintains community
power by developing personal networks through material exchanges
10. The 2003 study of local elites in the nine Korean cities shows that mayors and
other community leaders share the same localities where they grew up, or the
same high schools or colleges from which they graduated. This finding suggests
that a mayor’s local networks may be developed through identity-sharing based on
school and hometown ties (Park D. 2004). 
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national politicians may use the mayor’s local networks of clientelism
to secure and expand their political power at the national level. The
strength of these local and trans-local networks determines the politi-
cal fortunes of the mayor. By using networks of clientelism, the
mayor has been able to dominate local governance for the past
decade. In this regard, the Korean local government can be said to be
high in Type I autonomy, which means that the local government is
more able to pursue local interests “independently of local economic
and social interests and organizations, be they private, voluntary or
statutory” (King and Pierre 1990, 2). 
Overall, the Korean local government for the last decade has
been considerably independent of local economic and social interest
even though it has been subject to trans-local political constraints. In
this regard, it can be argued that community power largely remains
in the hands of the local government, albeit subject to central control.
The Korean local government, far from being an epiphenomenon of
the dynamics of local social forces, is a semi-autonomous actor with
its own preferences.
Conclusion
There are two competing views on the impact of local autonomy on
the redistribution of community power. The first holds that although
local autonomy is expected to increase opportunities for popular
political involvement, it would bring about a more unequal redistrib-
ution of community power. In particular, business interests, includ-
ing landed ones, would become more influential in the local decision-
making process because the local government tends to rely heavily
on their wealth. The second view contends that local autonomy
would bring about more political equality and democratic pluralism
because it increases popular control and includes marginal actors into
the local political process. Hence community power would be widely
dispersed. Has local autonomy in Korea increased the dominance of a
few economic elite or dispersed local power among plural local
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forces? My answer to both questions is not, as of yet, in the affirma-
tive. The local autonomy of the last decade has not increased the
dominance of business interests, as the elitism model may predict.
Nor has it dispersed local power among plural local forces, as plural-
ism may expect. Rather it has greatly increased the power of local
government, especially the local chief executive.
For the past decade, local governance in Korea has been domi-
nated by national politics largely due to a highly centralized system
of intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, the party politicization
of local elections renders local politics national rather than local.
Unlike in the United States, all politics in Korea remains hardly local.
In many respects, local governance appears to resemble national gov-
ernance. As the president dominates the legislature and the national
bureaucracy at the national level, the mayor dominates the council
and the local bureaucracy at the local level. The national government
is relatively independent of national economic and social interests.
Similarly, the local government is relatively independent of local eco-
nomic and social interests. With no powerful rivals in the local politi-
cal process, the mayor appears to be able to hold community power,
under a certain amount of central control.
For democratic local governance, governmental power needs to
be further decentralized in order to ensure meaningful local autono-
my. Decentralization would inevitably further augment the power of
local government, which is already powerful. At the same time, how-
ever, decentralization would make more visible the transformation of
local government into a function of the local policy process (Pratchett
and Wilson 1996). As the local government became the site for local
decision-making, local civil society would become organized and
vibrant while a local citizenry, self-confident and active. Local
empowerment for meaningful local autonomy, indeed, is a key step
toward a pluralist grassroots democracy in Korea.
137-154.
Lande, Carl H. 1973. “Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Obser-
vations on the Group Theory of Politics.” American Political Science
Review 67: 103-127.
Logan, John R, and Harvey L. Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortunes: The Political
Economy of Place. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA). 2002.
Jibang jachi baekseo: 1995-2001 (White Paper on Local Autonomy: 1995-
2001). Seoul: MOGAHA.
____________. 2005. Jibang jachi simnyeon pyeongga: 1995-2005 (Evaluation of
Local Autonomy for a Decade: 1995-2005). Seoul: MOGAHA.
Park, Chong-Min (Bak, Jong-min), ed. 2000a. “Seongnam-si sarye” (The Case
of the City of Seongnam). In Hanguk-ui jibang jeongchi-wa dosi gwol-
lyeok gujo (Local Politics and the Urban Power Structure in Korea).
Seoul: Nanam.
____________. 2000b. “Local Politics and the Urban Power Structure in South
Korea.” Korean Social Science Journal 27.2: 41-68.
____________. 2003. “Quality of Local Government and Democratic Citizen-
ship.” Social Indicators Research 62/63: 291-319.
Park, Chong-Min, and Shin Doh Chull. 2005. “Social Capital and Democratic
Citizenship: The Case of South Korea.” Japanese Journal of Political Sci-
ence 6.1: 63-85.
Park, Dae Sik (Bak, Dae-sik), ed. 2004. Hanguk jiyeok sahoe elliteu (Local
Elites in Korea). Seoul: Oreum.
Park, Dae Sik, and Kang Kyong Tae (Kang, Gyeong-tae), eds. 2005. Hanguk
jiyeok sahoe jumin chamyeo (Citizen Participation in the Communities of
Korea). Seoul: Oreum.
Peterson, Paul. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Piattoni, Simona, ed. 2001. Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representa-
tion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Polsby, Nelson W. 1980. Community Power and Political Ideology. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Pratchett, Lawrence, and David Wilson, eds. 1996. Local Democracy and
Local Government. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Reed, Steven R. 1986. Japanese Prefectures and Policymaking. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Stone, Clarence N. 1980. “Systemic Power in Community Decision Making.”
31Local Governance and Community Power in Korea
REFERENCES
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Atti-
tudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1970. Power and Poverty. New
Haven: Oxford University Press.
Bae, Byeong-yong. 2000. “Jinju-si sarye” (The Case of the City of Jinju). In
Hanguk-ui jibang jeongchi-wa dosi gwollyeok gujo (Local Politics and the
Urban Power Structure in Korea), edited by Park Chong-Min. Seoul:
Nanam.
Choi, Heungsuk (Choe, Heung-seok). 2000. “Bucheon-si sarye” (The Case of
the City of Bucheon). In Hanguk-ui jibang jeongchi-wa dosi gwollyeok
gujo (Local Politics and the Urban Power Structure in Korea), edited by
Park Chong-Min. Seoul: Nanam.
Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fox, Jonathan. 1994. “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizen-
ship: Lessons from Mexico.” World Politics 46.2: 151-184.
Guterbock, Thomas M. 1980. Machine Politics in Transition. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Hunter, Floyd. 1953. Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Hwang, Ah-Ran (Hwang, A-ran). 2002. “Jiyeokjuui-wa jibang jeongchi: gicho
danchejang-ui jeongdang gongcheon” (Regionalism and Local Politics:
Party Nomination of Local Chief Executives). Hanguk haengjeong hakbo
(Korean Public Administration Review) 36.2: 129-144.
Jeung, Young-Tae (Jeong, Yeong-tae). 1998. “Incheon-ui gwollyeok gujo-wa
jeongchi gwajeong” (Power Structure and the Political Process in
Incheon). Jeongchi bipyeong (Review of Politics) 4: 71-105.
Kim, SoonEun (Kim, Sun-eun). 1998. “Busan gwangyeoksi-ui jeongchi gwol-
lyeok gujo” (Political Power Structure in Busan). Jeongchi bipyeong
(Review of Politics) 4: 36-70.
King, Desmond S., and Jon Pierre, eds. 1990. “Introduction.” In Challenges to
Local Government. London: Sage.
Kwon, Osung (Kwon O-seong). 2004. “Minseon jibang jachi-ui silsi-ga si
jeongbu-ui jaejeong bun-gwonhwa-e michineun yeonghyang” (The
Impact of Elected Local Government on Fiscal Decentralization).
Hanguk haengjeong hakbo (Korean Public Administration Review) 38.1:
30 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2006
American Political Science Review 74: 978-990.
Yoo, Jae-Won (Yu, Jae-won). 2000. “Cheongju-si sarye” (The Case of the
City of Cheongju). In Hanguk-ui jibang jeongchi-wa dosi gwollyeok gujo
(Local Politics and the Urban Power Structure in Korea), edited by Park
Chong-Min. Seoul: Nanam.
Waste, Robert J., ed. 1986. Community Power: Directions for Future Research.
Beverly Hills: Sage.
32 KOREA JOURNAL / WINTER 2006
